A. Rights	A. Rights of shareholders 6						
A.1	Basic shareholder rights		Y/N	Reference/ Source document			
A.1.1(P)	Did the company fail or neglect to offer equal treatment for share repurchases to all shareholders?	OECD Principle II (A)	N/A				
A.2	Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to consult with each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights as defined in the Principles, subject to exceptions to prevent abuse.						
A.2.1(P)	shareholders from communicating or consulting with other shareholders?	OECD Principle II (G) Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to consult with each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights as defined in the Principles, subject to exceptions to prevent abuse.	N	The Company is wholly-owned by one (1) stockholder. Nonetheless, the Company directors, who are holders of nominee shares freely communicate or consult with one another during board meetings.			
A.3	Right to participate effectively in and vote in general shareholders meeting and should be informed of the rules, including voting procedures, that govern general shareholders meeting.						
A.3.1(P)	Did the company include any additional and unannounced agenda item into the notice of AGM/EGM?	OECD Principle II (C) 2	Ν	As certified by the Company's Corporate Secretary, there were no additional and unannounced agenda item in the notice of annual stockholders meeting.			

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			ICGN 8.5 Shareholder rights of action						
I WINDORKY SNAPENDIZER SNOULD BE ATTORAGED PROTECTION AND			Minority shareholders should be afforded protection and						

B.2	Protecting minority shareholders from abusive action			Since the Company is owned by only one stockholder, there is no minority shareholder to speak of.			
B.2.1(P)	Has there been any cases of non compliance with the laws, rules and regulations pertaining to significant or material related party transactions in the past three years?	OECD Principle III (B) Insider trading and abusive dealing should be prohibited ICGN 2.11.1 Related party transactions Companies should have a process for reviewing and monitoring any related party transaction. A committee of independent directors should review significant related party transactions to determine whether they are in the best interests of the company and if so to determine what terms are fair. ICGN 2.11.2 Director conflicts of interest Companies should have a process for identifying and managing any conflicts of interest directors may have. If a director has an interest in a matter under consideration by the board, then the director should not participate in those discussions and the board should follow any further appropriate processes. Individual directors should be conscious of shareholder and public perceptions and seek to avoid situations where there might be an appearance of a conflict of interest. ICGN 8.5 Shareholder rights of action Shareholders should be afforded rights of action and remedies which are readily accessible in order to redress conduct of company which treats them inequitably. Minority shareholders should be afforded protection and remedies against abusive or oppressive conduct.	Ν	There has been no case of non-compliance with laws, rules and regulations pertaining to significant or material related party transactions in the past three years.			
	Role of stakeholders The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual agreements are to be respected.						
C.1.1(P)	Have there been any violations of any laws pertaining to labour/employment/ consumer/insolvency/ commercial/competition or environmental issues?	OECD Principle IV (A) The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual agreements are to be respected.	N	There has been no violations of any laws pertaining to labour/employment/ consumer/insolvency/ commercial/competition or environmental issues.			
C.2	Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a timely and regular basis.	· / / / / / / / / / / / / / / _ / _ / _ / _ / _ / _ / _ / _ / / _ / / _ / / _ / / _ / / _ / / _ /					
C.2.1(P)	Has the company faced any sanctions by regulators for failure to make announcements within the requisite time period for material events?	OECD Principle IV (B) Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a timely and regular basis.	N	The Company has not faced any sanctions by regulators for failure to make announcements within the requisite period for material events.			

D. Disclo	D. Disclosure and transparency					
D.1	Sanctions from regulator on financial reports					
D.1.1(P)	Did the company receive a "qualified opinion" in its external audit report?	OECD Principle V: Disclosure and Transparency (B) Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial disclosures. (C) An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified, auditor in order to provide an	N	Annual Report (page 34) Financial Statements "x x x For the past few year and for the Year 0218, the Company has not received a qualified, adverse or disclaimer opinion in their audit of the Company."	2018 Annual Report	
D.1.2(P)	Did the company receive an "adverse opinion" in its external audit report?	external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in all material respects. (D) External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a duty to the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit.	N	Annual Report (page 34) Financial Statements "x x x For the past few year and for the Year 0218, the Company has not received a qualified, adverse or disclaimer opinion in their audit of the Company."	2018 Annual Report	
D.1.3(P)	Did the company receive a "disclaimer opinion" in its external audit report?	ICGN 6.2 Annual audit The annual audit carried out on behalf of shareholders is an essential part of the checks and balances required at a company. It should provide an independent and objective opinion that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in all material respects, give a true and fair view of the affairs of the company and are in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.	N	Annual Report (page 34) Financial Statements "x x x For the past few year and for the Year 0218, the Company has not received a qualified, adverse or disclaimer opinion in their audit of the Company."	2018 Annual Report	
D.1.4(P)	Has the company in the past year revised its financial statements for reasons other than changes in accounting policies?		N		Audited Financial Statements	

E. Bassansibilities of the Danud					
E. Responsibilities of the Board					
	Compliance with listing rules, regulations and applicable laws				
		OECD Principle VI (D) (7) Ensuring the integrity of the corporation's accounting and financial reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards.	N/A		
		UK CODE (JUNE 2010) A.4.3 Where directors have concerns which cannot be resolved about the running of the company or a proposed action, they should ensure that their concerns are recorded in the board minutes. On resignation, a non-executive director should provide a written statement to the chairman, for circulation to the board, if they have any such concerns.	N	There has been no instance where a non-executive directors has resigned and raised any issues of governance-related concerns.	
E.2	Board Appraisal			1	
	Does the Company have any independent directors/commissioners who have served for more than nine years or two terms (which ever is higher) in the same capacity?	OECD Principle V (C) An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified, auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in all material respects. Examples of other provisions to underpin auditor independence include, a total ban or severe limitation on the nature of non-audit work which can be undertaken by an auditor for their audit client, mandatory rotation of auditors (either partners or in some cases the audit partnership), a temporary ban on the employment of an ex-auditor by the audited company and prohibiting auditors or their dependents from having a financial stake or management role in the companies they audit.	Ν	The Company complies with the Insurance Commission limit on the term of independent directors reckoned from 2015.	
E.2.2(P)	Did the company fail to identify who are the independent director(s) / commissioner(s)?	ICGN 2.4 Composition and structure of the board ICGN 2.4.1 Skills and experience ICGN 2.4.3 Independence	N	Independent directors are identified in the Annual Report.	
E.3	External Audit	11		1	
	Is any of the directors or senior management a former employee or partner of the current external auditor (in the past 2 years)?	OECD Principle V (C) An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified, auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in all material respects. Examples of other provisions to underpin auditor independence include, a total ban or severe limitation on the nature of non-audit work which can be undertaken by an auditor for their audit client, mandatory rotation of auditors (either partners or in some cases the audit partnership), a temporary ban on the employment of an ex-auditor by the audited company and prohibiting auditors or their dependents from having a financial stake or management role in the companies they audit.	Ν	None of the Company's directors or senior management officers is a former employee or partner of the SGV and Co., in the past two years See Annual Report	2018 Annual Report
E.4	Board structure and composition	I			2010 Annual Report
	··· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				

E.4.1 (P)	Is any of the directors a former CEO of the		Γ		
	company in the past 2 years?	N	F	Based on the Board of Directors' Profile in the Annual Report, there is no director who is a former CEO of the Company in the past two (2) years.	
					2018 Annual Report